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RÉSUMÉ 
 
 Dans des environnements spatiaux, nous considérons des fonctions de bien-être 
social satisfaisant les hypothèses d’Arrow, i.e. la faiblesse au sens de Pareto et 
l’indépendance des alternatives non pertinentes. Lorsque l’espace des politiques est un 
continuum unidimensionnel, une telle fonction de bien-être est déterminée par une 
collection de 2N préférences strictement quasi-concaves et une règle de bris d’égalité. 
Comme corollaire, nous obtenons que, lorsque le nombre d’électeurs est impair, le vote 
à la majorité simple est transitif si et seulement si la préférence de chaque électeur est 
strictement quasi concave. Lorsque l’espace des politiques est multidimensionnel, nous 
établissons le théorème d’impossible d’Arrow. Nous montrons, entre autres, que la 
faiblesse au sens de Pareto, l’indépendance des alternatives non pertinentes et la non-
dictature sont incompatibles si l’ensemble des alternatives possède un intérieur 
non vide et est compact et convexe. 
 
Mots clés : théorème d’Arrow, indépendance des alternatives non pertinentes 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 In spatial environments, we consider social welfare functions satisfying Arrow's 
requirements, i.e., weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives. When the 
policy space is a one-dimensional continuum, such a welfare function is determined by 
a collection of 2N strictly quasi-concave preferences and a tie-breaking rule. As a 
corollary, we obtain that when the number of voters iis odd, simple majority voting is 
transitive if and only if each voter's preference is strictly quasi-concave. When the policy 
space is multi-dimensional, we establish Arrow's impossibility theorem. Among others, 
we show that weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and non-
dictatorship are inconsistent if the set of alternatives has a non-empty interior and it is 
compact and convex. 
 
Key words : Arrow's theorem, independence of irrelevant alternatives 
 
 
1 Introduction
A social welfare function is a procedure for aggregating proles of individual prefer-
ences into social orderings. Arrow's theorem shows that it is impossible for a social
welfare function to satisfy weak Pareto (if all individuals strictly prefer one alterna-
tive to another, then so does society), independence of irrelevant alternatives (the
social ranking of two alternatives only depends on the individual rankings of these al-
ternatives), and non-dictatorship when the preference domain is unrestricted. When
the set of alternatives is structured, the assumption of unrestricted domain might be
unreasonable. One important exception of this kind are spatial environments. In spa-
tial environments, alternatives are points in a Euclidean space of issue positions and
individual preferences are continuous, quasi-concave, and have bliss points. Although
the assumption of unrestricted domain is unreasonable in economic and spatial en-
vironments, it has been shown that Arrow's theorem remains valid in most of these
environments.
1
There is one well-known spatial environment in which Arrow's requirements are
consistent. If the number of voters is odd and the policy space is one-dimensional,
then simple majority voting is transitive and satises weak Pareto, independence of
irrelevant alternatives, and anonymity (Black ,1948; Arrow, 1951, 1963). Simple ma-
jority voting is an example of an Arrovian welfare function belonging to the following
class: if the number of voters is n, x n   1 preferences of constant voters, and ap-
ply to each prole of individual preferences majority voting over this prole and the
n 1 xed voters. However, a characterization of all welfare functions satisfying weak
Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives was missing. Our paper lls this
gap. The class of welfare functions described above, in which the preferences of the
xed voters are strictly quasi-concave, is characterized by weak Pareto, independence
of irrelevant alternatives, and anonymity up to a tie-breaking rule. If anonymity is
dropped, then instead of n 1 xed preferences we need 2
N
xed strictly quasi-concave
1
An excellent review of the literature is Le Breton and Weymark (2000a).
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preferences.
A key step in the proof of Arrow's theorem is that decisiveness of a coalition
spreads from one pair of alternatives to all pairs of alternatives. In proving the previ-
ous fact we need to assume that each individual's preference domain is unrestricted.
This is the dierence between one-dimensional spatial environments and environments
with an unrestricted domain. We show that in one-dimensional spatial environments
decisiveness of a coalition spreads in the following way: if a coalition is decisive over
\a preferred to b" (where a; b 2 R are such that a < b), then it is decisive over \a
preferred to c" for all c > b and over \c preferred to b" for all a < c < b. This implies
that for each coalition S, there is a point x
S
2 [ 1;+1] such that S is decisive
over \a preferred to b" for all x
S
< a < b and NnS is decisive over \c preferred to d"
for all d < c < x
S
. Therefore, when the peaks of S converge to  1 and the peaks
of NnS to +1, then an Arrovian welfare function chooses a strictly quasi-concave
ordering with quasi bliss point x
S
. The collection of 2
N
strictly quasi-concave prefer-
ences characterizes an Arrovian welfare function up to some tie-breaking rule. Here,
the key is to show that if the ranking over two alternatives is not determined, then
this does not cause any intransitivities, no matter what ranking we choose between
these two alternatives. Of course, this is only possible if the two alternatives belong
to opposite sides of the quasi bliss point of the social ordering and could form an
indierence class.
Our characterization is one of the few positive results in Arrovian social choice.
A corollary of our result is that simple majority voting is transitive if and only if
individual preferences are strictly quasi-concave.
If the policy space is multi-dimensional and unbounded, and preferences are Eu-
clidean, then Arrow's requirements are inconsistent (Border, 1984). Other proofs
show that the domain of Euclidean preferences is \saturating" and apply a result
due to Kalai, Muller, and Satterthwaite (1979) to deduce Arrow's impossibility (Le
2
Breton and Weymark, 1996, 2000a,b; Campbell, 1993
2
). However, the proofs of these
results rely importantly on the unboundedness of the policy space. As far as we
know, Arrow's theorem has not been established in spatial environments when the
set of alternatives is compact and convex. It is natural to assume that a govern-
ment faces budget constraints and therefore the set of policy alternatives becomes
bounded. We derive Arrow's theorem in such spatial environments. If individual
preferences are Euclidean and the set of alternatives has a non-empty interior and
it is compact and convex, then weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives,
and non-dictatorship are inconsistent, i.e. again decisiveness of a coalition spreads
from one pair of alternatives to all pairs of alternatives and dictatorship results.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our notation and
the main denitions. In Section 3 we characterize the welfare functions satisfying
weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives if the policy space is one-
dimensional. In Section 4 we show that weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant
alternatives, and non-dictatorship are inconsistent if the policy space is compact,
convex, and at least two-dimensional. Section 5 concludes.
2 Notation and Denitions
We use the same terminology and notation as Le Breton and Weymark (2000a). Let
N  f1; 2; : : : ; ng denote a nite set of agents with n  2, and let A  R
m
denote a
set of alternatives. Each point in R
m
identies the changes in the level of m dierent
policies, for example public spending on police, health care, and so on. LetW denote
the set of all complete and transitive relations over A. An element of W is called a
weak ordering over A. Given R
i
2 W, the corresponding strict relation, P
i
, and the
indierence relation, I
i
, are dened as follows: for all a; b 2 A, (i) aP
i
b, :bR
i
a, and
(ii) aI
i
b , aR
i
b and bR
i
a. Note that if :aR
i
b, then by completeness of R
i
, aR
i
b.
Hence, :bR
i
a is enough to describe the strict relation P
i
. Let R  W.
2
Campbell (1993) drops weak Pareto and imposes instead continuity of social preference.
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A (preference) prole is a list R  (R
i
)
i2N
2 R
N
. A (social) welfare function
associates with each prole a weak ordering over A. Formally, a welfare function is
a mapping f : R
N
! W such that for all R 2 R
N
, f(R) 2 W. We call f(R) the
social ordering (that f associates with R). Note that f(R) need not belong to the
individual preference domain R. Other authors impose the restriction that any social
ordering belongs to each individual's preference domain (for example, Peters, van der
Stel, and Storcken, 1992, and Bossert and Weymark, 1993).
Arrow's requirements are as follows. The rst axiom says that if all agents strictly
prefer a to b, then a should also be socially strictly preferred to b.
Weak Pareto: For allR 2 R
N
and all a; b 2 A, if for all i 2 N , aP
i
b, then :bf(R)a.
Given R 2 R
N
, X  A, and j 2 N , let R
j
jX denote the restriction of R
j
to
X, and RjX  (R
i
jX)
i2N
. The second axiom says that the social ordering of two
alternatives only depends on the prole of individual preferences restricted to these
two alternatives.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: For all R;

R 2 R
N
and all a; b 2 A,
if Rjfa; bg =

Rjfa; bg, then f(R)jfa; bg = f(

R)jfa; bg.
A welfare function is Arrovian if it satises weak Pareto and independence of ir-
relevant alternatives. A welfare function is dictatorial if there exists some agent such
that for each prole the social strict preference relation respects the strict preference
relation of this agent.
Non-Dictatorship: There exists no i 2 N such that for all R 2 R
N
and all
a; b 2 A, if aP
i
b, then :bf(R)a.
4
A welfare function treats individuals symmetrically if for all permutations of in-
dividuals' preferences, the social ordering remains unchanged.
Anonymity: For all R 2 R
N
and all permutations  of N , f((R)) = f(R).
3 One-Dimensional Policy Spaces
In this section the policy space is a one-dimensional continuum. Specically, the set
of alternatives is the set of real numbers R. For example, in an election each element
of R represents a candidate's political ideology on a left-right spectrum.
Given i 2 N , a weak ordering R
i
2 W is single-peaked if there exists a point
p(R
i
) 2 R, called the peak of R
i
, such that for all a; b 2 R, if a < b  p(R
i
) or
p(R
i
)  b < a, then bP
i
a. Let R denote the set of all single-peaked preferences over
R. Each agent i 2 N has a single-peaked preference relation over R. A single-peaked
preference R
i
2 R is symmetric if for all a; b 2 R, aR
i
b, ja  p(R
i
)j  jb  p(R
i
)j.
We will give a complete characterization of all welfare functions satisfying weak
Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives. In this characterization the fol-
lowing weak orderings are important.
A weak ordering R
i
2 W is strictly quasi-concave, if for all a; b; c 2 R such that
a < b < c, we have :aR
i
b or :cR
i
b. In other words, b is never a worst alternative in
fa; b; cg and the restriction of R
i
to fa; b; cg is single-peaked . Let C denote the set
of all strictly quasi-concave orderings over R.
Lemma 3.1 Let R
i
2 W. The weak ordering R
i
is strictly quasi-concave if and only
if there exists a quasi bliss point p(R
i
) 2 R [ f 1;+1g (for convenience we use
the same notation as for peaks) such that (i) for all a; b 2 R, if a < b < p(R
i
) or
p(R
i
) < b < a, then bP
i
a, and (ii) if p(R
i
) 2 R, then either (for all x 2 ] 1; p(R
i
)[,
p(R
i
)P
i
x), or (for all x 2 ]p(R
i
);+1[, p(R
i
)P
i
x).
Proof. It is easy to check that R
i
is strictly quasi-concave if (i) and (ii) hold.
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Let R
i
be strictly quasi-concave. For all x 2 R, let B(x;R
i
)  fy 2 R j xR
i
yg. Let
(x
k
)
k2N
be a sequence in R such that for all k 2 N , if B(x
k
; R
i
) 6= R, then B(x
k
; R
i
) (
B(x
k+1
; R
i
), and for all y 2 R, there exists k 2 N such that y 2 B(x
k
; R
i
). Without
loss of generality, let (x
k
)
k2N
converge to p(R
i
) (otherwise we choose a convergent
subsequence of (x
k
)
k2N
). We show (i) and (ii).
Let a; b 2 R be such that a < b < p(R
i
) or p(R
i
) < b < a. Then there exists k 2 N
such that b 2 B(x
k
; R
i
) and jx
k
  p(R
i
)j < jb  p(R
i
)j. Thus, x
k
R
i
b and a < b < x
k
or x
k
< b < a. Because R
i
is strictly quasi-concave, bP
i
a, which is (i).
Suppose that p(R
i
) 2 R but (ii) does not hold. Then for some a; b 2 R we have
a < p(R
i
) < b, aR
i
p(R
i
), and bR
i
p(R
i
). Obviously, this is in contradiction to strict
quasi-concavity of R
i
. 
Obviously, R  C. However, a strictly quasi-concave preference R
i
may not be
single-peaked, even if p(R
i
) 2 R. For example, let u : R ! R be such that for all
x 2 R, u(x) 
1
x
if x > 0 and u(x) = x if x  0. Let R
u
2 W be such that for all
a; b 2 R, aR
u
b, u(a)  u(b). Then R
u
2 CnR.
3.1 Decisiveness
Given S  N and a; b 2 A, we say that S is semi-decisive over \a preferred to b"
if there exists R 2 R
N
such that (i) for all i 2 S, aP
i
b, (ii) for all i 2 NnS, bP
i
a,
and (iii) af(R)b.
3
Let D
s
(a; b) denote the set of all coalitions that are semi-decisive
over \a preferred to b". Given a; b 2 A and R 2 R, if :bf(R)a whenever aP
i
b for all
i 2 S, then S is said to be decisive over \a preferred to b". Let D(a; b) denote the
set of all coalitions that are decisive over \a preferred to b".
One of the important steps in Arrow's impossibility theorem is that whenever a
coalition S  N is decisive over \a preferred to b", then it is also decisive over \a
3
The literature on Arrovian social choice often refers to our denition as \a coalition is semi-
decisive over the pair (a; b)".
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preferred to c" and \c preferred to b" for any other alternative c. Therefore, every
coalition is either decisive over every pair of alternatives or over no pair.
Because here individual preferences are restricted to be single-peaked and the pol-
icy space is one-dimensional, decisiveness of a coalition does not spread over all pairs
of alternatives as in Arrow's original theorem. Decisiveness of a coalition expands in
a weaker form. Given a; b 2 R such that a < b, if S is semi-decisive over \a preferred
to b", then S is decisive over \a preferred to c" for all c 2 ]b;+1[ and S is decisive
over \c preferred to b" for all c 2 ]a; b[.
Lemma 3.2 Let f : R
N
! W be a welfare function satisfying weak Pareto and
independence of irrelevant alternatives. Let S  N and a; b; c 2 R be such that
a < b < c or a > b > c.
(i) If S 2 D
s
(a; b), then S 2 D(a; c).
(ii) If S 2 D
s
(a; c), then S 2 D(b; c).
Proof. First, we show (i). Let R 2 R
N
be such that for all i 2 S, aP
i
c. We have
to show that :cf(R)a. Let
~
R 2 R
N
be such that
(a) for all i 2 N ,
~
R
i
jfa; cg = R
i
jfa; cg;
(b) for all i 2 S, a
~
P
i
b and b
~
P
i
c; and
(c) for all i 2 NnS, b
~
P
i
a and b
~
P
i
c.
It is easy to check that we can nd
~
R 2 R
N
such that (a) to (c) are satised (for all
i 2 N , we can even choose
~
R
i
to be symmetric). By (b) and (c), for all i 2 N , b
~
P
i
c.
Thus, by weak Pareto, :cf(
~
R)b. Because S 2 D
s
(a; b) and f satises independence
of irrelevant alternatives, (b) and (c) imply af(
~
R)b. Thus, by transitivity of f(
~
R),
:cf(
~
R)a. Hence, by (a) and independence of irrelevant alternatives, :cf(R)a and
S 2 D(a; c), the desired conclusion.
Second, we show (ii). Let R 2 R
N
be such that for all i 2 S, bP
i
c. We have to
show that :cf(R)b. Let
~
R 2 R
N
be such that
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(a) for all i 2 N ,
~
R
i
jfb; cg = R
i
jfb; cg,
(b) for all i 2 S, b
~
P
i
a and a
~
P
i
c, and
(c) for all i 2 NnS, b
~
P
i
a and c
~
P
i
a.
(Again, for all i 2 N ,
~
R
i
can be chosen to be symmetric.) By weak Pareto, :af(
~
R)b.
Because S 2 D
s
(a; c), we have af(
~
R)c. Thus, by transitivity of f(
~
R), :cf(
~
R)b. By
(a) and independence of irrelevant alternatives, :cf(R)b. Hence, S 2 D(b; c), the
desired conclusion. 
3.2 Social Orderings at Maximal Conicts
In avoiding limits of proles we add two non-single-peaked preferences to the set R.
Obviously,  and  are preferences over R, where  has a bliss point at +1 and 
at  1.
Let
~
R  R [ f;g. The following lemma shows that the addition of  and 
to R has no inuence on a welfare function satisfying weak Pareto and independence
of irrelevant alternatives.
Lemma 3.3 Let f : R
N
! W be a welfare function satisfying weak Pareto and
independence of irrelevant alternatives. Dene
~
f :
~
R
N
! W as follows: for all
R 2
~
R
N
and all a; b 2 R, take

R 2 R
N
such that

Rjfa; bg = Rjfa; bg and set
~
f(R)jfa; bg  f(

R)jfa; bg:
Then
~
f is a well-dened welfare function satisfying weak Pareto and independence of
irrelevant alternatives. Moreover,
~
f jR
N
= f .
Proof. Let R 2
~
R
N
. Because f satises independence of irrelevant alternatives, for
all a; b 2 R,
~
f(R)jfa; bg is well-dened. Thus,
~
f satises weak Pareto and indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives. Obviously,
~
f(R) is complete. It remains to show that
~
f(R) is transitive. Let a; b; c 2 R be such that a  b  c. Let

R 2 R
N
be such that
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for all i 2 N , (i) if R
i
= , then p(

R
i
) = a, (ii) if R
i
2 R, then

R
i
= R
i
, and (iii)
if R
i
= , then p(

R
i
) = c. By denition,
~
f(R)jfa; b; cg = f(

R)jfa; b; cg and
~
f(R) is
transitive. 
Given a coalition S  N , we consider the prole where the members belonging to
S announce  and the other agents announce . Clearly, the coalitions S and NnS
disagree on every pair of dierent alternatives. We show that the social orderings
at these proles of maximal conicts are strictly quasi-concave. They also satisfy a
certain monotonicity property and determine for each prole the social ordering up
to some tie-breaking when social preference can be chosen to be arbitrary.
Throughout the remaining part of Subsection 3.2, let f be a welfare function
satisfying weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives. For all S  N , let
(
S
;
NnS
) be the prole R 2
~
R
N
such that for all i 2 S, R
i
= , and for all i 2 NnS,
R
i
= . Then for all S  N , let Q
S

~
f(
S
;
NnS
). Let Q  fQ
S
jS  Ng. We call
Q a collection of calibration relations. We will show that Q completely determines f
(up to some tie-breaking). By Lemma 3.3,
~
f satises weak Pareto. Thus, Q
;
= 
and Q
N
= . The following lemma species some properties of the collection Q.
Lemma 3.4 (i) The collection Q is (inclusive) monotone, i.e. for all S; T  N
such that S  T , and all a; b; c; d 2 R such that a < b < c < d, (i.i) if bQ
S
c,
then :dQ
T
b; (i.ii) if bQ
S
d, then :dQ
T
c; (i.iii) if cQ
T
b, then :aQ
S
c; and (i.iv)
if cQ
T
a, then :aQ
S
b.
(ii) For all S  N , Q
S
2 C.
(iii) For all S; T  N , if S  T , then p(Q
T
)  p(Q
S
).
Proof. (i) By denition, Q
S
=
~
f(
S
;
NnS
) and Q
T
=
~
f(
T
;
NnT
). If bQ
S
c, then
S 2 D
s
(b; c). Thus, by Lemma 3.2, S 2 D(b; d). Hence, by S  T , we have :dQ
T
b.
Statements (i.ii), (i.iii), and (i.iv) follow similarly.
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(ii) Let a; b; c 2 R be such that a < b < c. Suppose that aQ
S
b and cQ
S
b. Then
by (i.i), :cQ
S
a, and by (i.iii), :aQ
S
c, which contradicts completeness of Q
S
.
(iii) Suppose that p(Q
T
) > p(Q
S
). Let a; b; c 2 ]p(Q
S
); p(Q
T
)[ be such that
a < b < c. Then aQ
S
b and S 2 D
s
(a; b). Thus, by Lemma 3.2, S 2 D(a; c). By
S  T , aQ
T
c. This is a contradiction to a < c < p(Q
T
) and Q
T
2 C. 
Recall that a strictly quasi-concave preference R
i
2 C is either equal to  or , or
there exists a quasi bliss point p(R
i
) 2 R such that (i) for all a; b 2 R, if a < b < p(R
i
)
or p(R
i
) < b < a, then bP
i
a, and (ii) either (for all x 2 ]  1; p(R
i
)[, p(R
i
)P
i
x), or
(for all x 2 ]p(R
i
);+1[, p(R
i
)P
i
x). We use the convention that p()   1 and
p()  +1.
Next, we show that for each prole the social ordering is strictly quasi-concave.
Let R 2 R
N
be such that p(R
i
1
)  p(R
i
2
)      p(R
i
n
). Let S
0
 ;
and for all t 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng, S
t
 fi
1
; i
2
; : : : ; i
t
g. Thus, S
n
= N . The median
of M(R) = fp(R
i
1
); p(R
i
2
); : : : ; p(R
i
n
); p(Q
S
0
); p(Q
S
1
); : : : ; p(Q
S
n
)g is the number
m(R) 2 R such that (i) m(R) 2 M(R), (ii) at least n + 1 elements of M(R) are
smaller than or equal to m(R), and (iii) at least n+ 1 elements of M(R) are greater
than or equal to m(R).
Theorem 3.1 For all R 2 R
N
, f(R) is strictly quasi-concave with quasi bliss point
m(R). Furthermore, if m(R) =2 fp(Q
S
) jS  Ng, then f(R) is single-peaked.
Proof. Let R 2 R
N
. Without loss of generality, suppose p(R
1
)  p(R
2
)     
p(R
n
). By independence of irrelevant alternatives, we have (i) f(R)j] 1; p(R
1
)] =
Q
;
j] 1; p(R
1
)] =  j] 1; p(R
1
)], (ii) for all t 2 f1; 2; : : : n  1g,
f(R)j[p(R
t
); p(R
t+1
)] = Q
S
t
j[p(R
t
); p(R
t+1
)]; (1)
and (iii) f(R)j[p(R
n
);+1[ = Q
N
j[p(R
n
);+1[ =  j[p(R
n
);+1[.
Because p(Q
;
) = +1 and p(Q
N
) =  1, we have m(R) 2 [p(R
1
); p(R
n
)]. Let
a; b 2 R be such that m(R) < a < b. We show that :bf(R)a. If a  p(R
n
), then the
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assertion follows from f(R)j[p(R
n
);+1[ =  j[p(R
n
);+1[. Let t
0
2 f1; 2; : : : ; n  1g
be such that a 2 [p(R
t
0
); p(R
t
0
+1
)[ and c 2 ]a; p(R
t
0
+1
)[ \ ]a; b[. We claim that
p(Q
S
t
0
)  m(R). If p(Q
S
t
0
) > m(R), then by Lemma 3.4 at least n + 1 numbers are
greater thanm(R), namely fp(Q
S
0
); p(Q
S
1
); : : : ; p(Q
S
t
0
); p(R
t
0
+1
); p(R
t
0
+2
); : : : ; p(R
n
)g,
which contradicts the median property of m(R). Thus, p(Q
S
t
0
)  m(R) < a.
By (1), f(R)j[p(R
t
0
); p(R
t
0
+1
)] = Q
S
t
0
j[p(R
t
0
); p(R
t
0
+1
)]. Hence, :cf(R)a. Thus,
S
t
0
2 D
s
(a; c). By Lemma 3.2 and a < c < b, S
t
0
2 D(a; b). Hence, :bf(R)a, the
desired conclusion. Similarly it can be shown that for all a; b 2 R, if b < a < m(R),
then :bf(R)a.
Let t
00
2 f1; 2; : : : ; n   1g be such that m(R) 2 [p(R
t
00
); p(R
t
00
+1
)]. If m(R) 2
]p(R
t
00
); p(R
t
00
+1
)[, then f(R)j]p(R
t
00
); p(R
t
00
+1
)[ = Q
S
t
00
j]p(R
t
00
); p(R
t
00
+1
)[ implies p(f(R)) =
m(R) = p(Q
S
t
00
) and f(R) 2 C. If m(R) 2 fp(R
1
); p(R
n
)g, then (i) or (iii) implies
f(R) 2 C.
Suppose that m(R) = p(R
t
00
) and p(R
t
00
) =2 fp(R
1
); p(R
n
)g. Let S  fi 2
N j p(R
i
) < m(R)g and T  fi 2 N j p(R
i
)  m(R)g. Then S 6= ;, S ( T , and
T 6= N . Thus, ]p(R
jSj
); p(R
jSj+1
)[ 6= ; and ]p(R
jT j
); p(R
jT j+1
)[ 6= ;. Similar arguments
as above imply that p(Q
T
)  m(R)  p(Q
S
). If p(Q
T
) < m(R), then by (1), for
all x 2 ]p(R
jT j
); p(R
jT j+1
)[, :xf(R)m(R), and f(R) 2 C. If p(Q
S
) > m(R), then
by (1), for all x 2 ]p(R
jSj
); p(R
jSj+1
)[, :xf(R)m(R), and f(R) 2 C. Suppose that
p(Q
T
) = m(R) = p(Q
S
). By (1), f(R)j]p(R
jSj
); p(R
jSj+1
)] = Q
S
j]p(R
jSj
); p(R
jSj+1
)]
and f(R)j[p(R
jT j
); p(R
jT j+1
)[ = Q
T
j[p(R
jT j
); p(R
jT j+1
)[. If f(R) =2 C, then for some
a 2 ]p(R
jSj
); p(R
jSj+1
)[, af(R)m(R), and for some b 2 ]p(R
jT j
); p(R
jT j+1
)[, bf(R)m(R).
Thus, S 2 D
s
(a;m(R)) and NnT 2 D
s
(b;m(R)). Hence, by Lemma 3.2, S 2 D(a; b)
and NnT 2 D(a; b). Therefore, :af(R)b and :bf(R)a, which contradicts complete-
ness of f(R). Hence, f(R) 2 C.
If m(R) =2 fp(Q
S
0
) jS
0
 Ng, then p(Q
T
) < m(R) < p(Q
S
). Hence, by (1),
f(R) 2 R. 
Remark 3.1 If for all S  N , Q
S
2 f;g, then for all R 2 R
N
, f(R) is a single-
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peaked preference relation. 
By Theorem 3.1, for all R 2 R
N
, the collection Q determines the social ordering
f(R) restricted to ]  1; m(R)[ and to ]m(R);+1[ (and either on ]  1; m(R)] or
[m(R);+1[). However, the quasi bliss point m(R) needs not be the socially most
preferred alternative. Next we show that Q also determines the ranking of f(R) over
all pairs (up to some arbitrary tie-breaking).
Lemma 3.5 Let R 2 R
N
and a; b 2 R be such that a < b. Let S  fi 2 N j aP
i
bg,
U  fi 2 N j bP
i
ag, and T  Nn(S [ U). Then the following holds.
(i) If for some x 2 ]a; b[, aQ
S
x, or for some x 2 ] 1; a[, xQ
S
b, then :bf(R)a.
(ii) If for some x 2 ]a; b[, bQ
S[T
x, or for some x 2 ]b;+1[, xQ
S[T
a, then :af(R)b.
(iii) If the presumptions of (i) and (ii) do not hold, then for all x 2 ]a; b[, we have
:af(R)x and :bf(R)x, and for all x 2 ] 1; a[ [ ]b;+1[, we have :xf(R)a
and :xf(R)b.
Proof. By denition, for all i 2 T , aI
i
b.
First, we show (i). If for some x 2 ]a; b[, aQ
S
x, then S 2 D
s
(a; x). Thus, by
Lemma 3.2 and a < x < b, S 2 D(a; b) and :bf(R)a. If for some x 2 ] 1; a[, xQ
S
b,
then S 2 D
s
(x; b). Thus, by Lemma 3.2 and x < a < b, S 2 D(a; b) and :bf(R)a.
Second, we show (ii). If for some x 2 ]a; b[, bQ
S[T
x, then U 2 D
s
(b; x). Thus,
by Lemma 3.2 and b > x > a, U 2 D(b; a) and :af(R)b. If for some x 2 ]b;+1[,
xQ
S[T
a, then U 2 D
s
(x; a). Thus, by Lemma 3.2 and x > b > a, U 2 D(b; a) and
:af(R)b.
Third, we show (iii). Because the presumptions of (i) and (ii) do not hold, we
have
(a) for all x 2 ] 1; a[, :xQ
S
b;
(b) for all x 2 ]a; b[, :aQ
S
x and :bQ
S[T
x; and
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(c) for all x 2 ]b;+1[, :xQ
S[T
a.
Let x 2 ] 1; a[. We want to show that :xf(R)a and :xf(R)b. Because for all
i 2 N , R
i
is single-peaked, we have for all i 2 T [ U , aP
i
x and bP
i
x. Let y 2 ]x; a[.
By (a), bQ
S
y. Thus, T [U 2 D
s
(b; y). By Lemma 3.2 and b > y > x, T [U 2 D(b; x).
Hence, :xf(R)b. By Theorem 3.1, f(R) 2 C. Thus, from x < a < b and :xf(R)b we
obtain :xf(R)a.
Let x 2 ]a; b[. We want to show that :af(R)x and :bf(R)x. Because for all
i 2 N , R
i
is single-peaked, we have for all i 2 S, xP
i
b, for all i 2 U , xP
i
a, and for all
i 2 T , xP
i
a and xP
i
b. Let y 2 ]x; b[. By (b), yQ
S
a and T [ U 2 D
s
(y; a). Thus, by
Lemma 3.2 and y > x > a, T [ U 2 D(x; a) and :af(R)x. Let z 2 ]a; x[. By (b),
zQ
S[T
b and S [ T 2 D
s
(z; b). Thus, by Lemma 3.2 and z < x < b, S [ T 2 D(x; b)
and :bf(R)x.
Let x 2 ]b;+1[. We want to show that :xf(R)a and :xf(R)b. Because for all
i 2 N , R
i
is single-peaked, we have for all i 2 S[T , aP
i
x and bP
i
x. Let y 2 ]b; x[. By
(c), aQ
S[T
y. Thus, S[T 2 D
s
(a; y). By Lemma 3.2 and a < y < x, S[T 2 D(a; x).
Hence, :xf(R)a. By Theorem 3.1, f(R) 2 C. Thus, from a < b < x and :xf(R)a
we obtain :xf(R)b. 
In (i) and (ii) of Lemma 3.5, the ranking of f(R) over fa; bg is uniquely determined
by Q. If neither (i) nor (ii) hold, then the ranking of f(R) over fa; bg can be taken
arbitrarily without causing intransitivities.
3.3 The Characterization
In the previous subsection we identied a monotone collection Q of strictly quasi-
concave orderings from a welfare function satisfying weak Pareto and independence of
irrelevant alternatives. Theorem 3.1 and Lemma 3.5 imply that the welfare function
is completely determined by Q. These results reveal the characteristics of such a
welfare function.
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In formulating the characterization result, we need a precise denition of tie-
breaking. Given a; b 2 R, let W
fa;bg
denote the set of weak orderings over fa; bg.
Obviously, only three orderings over fa; bg are possible: a is strictly preferred to b,
a and b are indierent, and b is strictly preferred to a. A tie-breaking rule  is a
family of functions 
fa;bg
, indexed by fa; bg (where a; b 2 R and a 6= b), fromW
N
fa;bg
to
W
fa;bg
. The function 
fa;bg
assigns to each prole of orderings over fa; bg an element
inW
fa;bg
. Tie-breaking should not be read to be strict because the resulting ordering
over fa; bg may be indierence.
Fixed-Strictly-Quasi-Concave Welfare Function, f
Q

: Given a monotone col-
lection Q of strictly quasi-concave orderings such that Q
;
=  and Q
N
= , and
a tie-breaking rule  , the xed-strictly-quasi-concave welfare function f
Q

associated
with Q and  is dened as follows. Let R 2 R
N
and a; b 2 R be such that a  b. Let
S  fi 2 N j aP
i
bg, U  fi 2 N j bP
i
ag, and T  Nn(S [ U). Then
() if a = b, then af
Q

(R)b;
() if a < b and for some x 2 ]a; b[, aQ
S
x, or for some x 2 ]  1; a[, xQ
S
b, then
af
Q

(R)b and :bf
Q

(R)a;
() if a < b and for some x 2 ]a; b[, bQ
S[T
x, or for some x 2 ]b;+1[, xQ
S[T
a, then
bf
Q

(R)a and :af
Q

(R)b; and
() if a < b and (a) for all x 2 ]   1; a[, :xQ
S
b, (b) for all x 2 ]a; b[, :aQ
S
x
and :bQ
S[T
x, and (c) for all x 2 ]b;+1[, :xQ
S[T
a, then f
Q

(R)jfa; bg 

fa;bg
(Rjfa; bg). 
Lemma 3.6 A xed-strictly-quasi-concave welfare function is a well-dened welfare
function satisfying weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives.
Proof. Let Q be a monotone collection of strictly quasi-concave orderings and  be
a tie-breaking rule. Let f
Q

be dened as above.
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First, we prove well-denedness of f
Q

. We have to show that () and () exclude
each other.
Let a; b 2 R be such that () holds for a and b. Thus, a < b. If for some
x 2 ]a; b[, aQ
S
x, then by strict quasi-concavity of Q
S
and a < x < b, :bQ
S
x. Thus,
by transitivity, :bQ
S
a. If for some x 2 ] 1; a[, xQ
S
b, then by strict quasi-concavity
of Q
S
and x < a < b, :bQ
S
a. Hence, in both cases we have :bQ
S
a and aQ
S
b.
Because Q is monotone and aQ
S
b, by (i.ii) of Lemma 3.4 we have for all y 2 ]a; b[,
:bQ
S[T
y. Because Q is monotone and aQ
S
b, by (i.i) of Lemma 3.4 we have for all
y 2 ]b;+1[, :yQ
S[T
a. Hence, () does not hold.
Second, we show that f
Q

is a welfare function. Let R 2 R
N
. By denition, f
Q

(R)
is complete. It remains to show that f
Q

(R) is transitive. Let a; b; c 2 R be such that
a < b < c. If :af
Q

(R)b and :cf
Q

(R)b, then f
Q

(R)jfa; b; cg is transitive. Thus, in
proving transitivity of f
Q

(R), it suces to show the following two implications: if
af
Q

(R)b, then :cf
Q

(R)a; and if cf
Q

(R)b, then :af
Q

(R)c.
We only prove the rst implication. The second implication follows similarly. Let
af
Q

(R)b. Then () or () holds for a and b. Let S  fi 2 N j aP
i
bg, U  fi 2
N j bP
i
ag, T  Nn(S [ U), and S
0
 fi 2 N j aP
i
cg. Because a < b < c and for all
i 2 N , R
i
is single-peaked, we have S [ T  S
0
.
4
We distinguish two cases.
Case 1: af
Q

(R)b because of ().
If for some x 2 ]a; b[, aQ
S
x, then, because Q is monotone and S  S
0
, for some
y 2 ]x; b[, aQ
S
0
y. Since a < b < c, we have y 2 ]a; c[ and by (), :cf
Q

(R)a. If
for some x 2 ]   1; a[, xQ
S
b, then, because Q is monotone and S  S
0
, for some
y 2 ]x; a[, yQ
S
0
b. Thus, by strict quasi-concavity of Q
S
0
and y < a < b < c, yQ
S
0
c.
Hence, by (), :cf
Q

(R)a.
Case 2: af
Q

(R)b because of ().
We show that () holds for a and c. Let x 2 ]b; c[. Then by (), part (c), :xQ
S[T
a.
Thus, aQ
S[T
x. Because Q is monotone and S [ T  S
0
, for some y 2 ]x; c[, aQ
S
0
y.
4
Note that this implication remains true if for all i 2 N , R
i
is strictly quasi-concave.
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Thus, by y 2 ]a; c[ and (), :cf
Q

(R)a, the desired conclusion.
Third, we show that f
Q

satises weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant al-
ternatives. Because Q
;
=  and Q
N
= , it is easy to check that f
Q

satises
weak Pareto. Obviously, by denition, f
Q

satises independence of irrelevant alter-
natives. 
The following theorem characterizes the class of welfare functions satisfying Ar-
row's requirements on the domain of all single-peaked preferences over a one-dimensional
policy space.
Theorem 3.2 On the domain of single-peaked preferences, the class of xed-strictly-
quasi-concave welfare functions is characterized by weak Pareto and independence of
irrelevant alternatives.
Proof. From Lemma 3.6 it follows that a xed-strictly-quasi-concave welfare func-
tion is a well-dened welfare function satisfying weak Pareto and independence of
irrelevant alternatives.
Conversely, let f be a welfare function satisfying weak Pareto and independence
of irrelevant alternatives. Lemma 3.4 shows the existence of a monotone collection
Q of strictly quasi-concave orderings. Let R 2 R
N
and a; b 2 R. From Lemma 3.5
it follows that f(R)jfa; bg satises the denitions (), (), and (). Finally, if ()
holds, then dene 
fa;bg
(Rjfa; bg)  f(R)jfa; bg. Now it is obvious that f is a xed-
strictly-quasi-concave welfare function associated with Q and  . 
Theorem 3.2 remains valid if the set of alternatives is a open or compact interval
and/or each individual's preference domain is the set of all symmetric single-peaked
preferences.
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3.4 Majority Voting
In this subsection we explore the relation between xed-strictly-quasi-concave welfare
functions and majority voting. Under majority voting, for a given prole of prefer-
ences, one alternative is ranked above another if and only if a majority of voters
weakly prefers the former alternative to the latter. If the number of individuals is
odd, majority voting is a well-dened welfare function (Black, 1948; Arrow, 1951).
However, if the number of individuals is even, then the social indierence relation
may be intransitive. In resolving this intransitivity, we add an odd number of xed
strictly quasi-concave relations and determine the majority preference relation for the
prole of individual's preferences and the xed voter's preferences.
Let O  (O
0
; O
1
; : : : ; O
n
) denote a prole of n + 1 xed voters' preferences such
that O
0
= , O
n
= , and for all t 2 f1; : : : ; n   1g, O
t
2 C. Let Q(O) denote the
collection of strictly quasi-concave preferences associated with O, i.e. for all S  N ,
Q
S
= O
jSj
. We call O strongly monotone when for all S; T  N such that S  T and
all a; b 2 R such that a < b, (i) if aO
jSj
b, then aO
jT j
b; and (ii) if bO
jT j
a, then bO
jSj
a.
Obviously, if O is strongly monotone, then Q(O) is monotone. Given a strongly
monotone prole O of n+1 xed voters, the majority welfare function g
O
associated
with O is dened as follows. For all R 2 R
N
and all a; b 2 R,
ag
O
(R)b,jfi 2 N j :bR
i
agj [ jft 2 f0; 1; : : : ; ng j :bO
t
agj
 jfi 2 N j :aR
i
bgj [ jft 2 f0; 1; : : : ; ng j :aO
t
bgj:
The majority tie breaking rule 
O
associated with O is dened as follows: for all
R 2 R
N
and all a; b 2 R, 
O
fa;bg
(Rjfa; bg)  g
O
(R)jfa; bg.
If O is a strongly monotone prole of n+1 xed voters, then the majority welfare
function g
O
is the xed-strictly-quasi-concave welfare function associated with Q(O)
and the majority tie-breaking rule 
O
.
Proposition 3.1 If O is a strongly monotone prole of n + 1 xed voters, then
g
O
= f
Q(O)

O
.
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Proof. Let R 2 R
N
and a; b 2 R be such that a < b. Let S  fi 2 N j aP
i
bg,
U  fi 2 N j bP
i
ag, and T  Nn(S [ U). It suces to show that f
Q(O)

O
jfa; bg =
g
O
(R)jfa; bg.
Let af
Q(O)

O
(R)b. If af
Q(O)

O
(R)b because of (), then by denition of 
O
, ag
O
(R)b.
If af
Q(O)

O
(R)b because of (), then :bO
jSj
a and because O is strongly monotone, at
least n + 1 voters strictly prefer a to b, namely S [ fjSj; jSj + 1; : : : ; jN jg. Thus,
:bg
O
(R)a. Similarly it can be shown that bf
Q(O)

O
(R)a implies bg
O
(R)a.
Let ag
O
(R)b. First, we show that if :bO
jSj
a, then () does not hold. Because O is
strongly monotone, we have :bO
jS[T j
a. Thus, by strict quasi-concavity of O
jS[T j
, for
all x 2 ]a; b[, :bO
jS[T j
x, and for all x 2 ]b;+1[, :xO
jS[T j
a, and () does not hold.
Thus, if :bO
jSj
a, then () or () holds for a and b and by denition, af
Q(O)

O
(R)b.
Similarly it can be shown if bg
O
(R)a and :aO
jS[T j
b, then () does not hold and
bf
Q(O)

O
(R)a.
If bO
jSj
a and aO
jS[T j
b, then () and () do not hold and by (), f
Q(O)

O
jfa; bg =
g
O
(R)jfa; bg, the desired conclusion. 
If f
Q

is an anonymous welfare function, then for all coalitions S, Q
S
depends
only on the cardinality of jSj. In particular, the prole (Q
;
; Q
f1g
; Q
f1;2g
; : : : ; Q
N
) is a
prole of n+1 xed voters. However, majority welfare functions are not characterized
by weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and anonymity. This is due
to the fact that the tie breaking rule  need not be the majority tie breaking rule
associated with the prole of n+ 1 xed voters.
If n is odd, for all k 2 f0; 1; : : : ;
1
2
(n   1)g, O
k
= , and for all l 2 f
1
2
(n   1) +
1; : : : ; ng, O
l
= , then Theorem 3.1 and Proposition 3.1 yield Black's celebrated
median voter theorem saying that the median of the individual peaks is equal to the
alternative that is top-ranked according to simple majority preference. Let g
m
denote
the simple majority welfare function. As an application of our results we show the
following. If the number of voters is odd and the policy space is one-dimensional,
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then simple majority voting is transitive if and only if each voter's preference relation
is strictly quasi-concave.
Theorem 3.3 Let jN j be odd and jN j 6= 1. The domain of strictly quasi-concave
preferences is the unique maximal domain

R
N
such that
(i) R
N


R
N
 W
N
and
(ii) simple majority voting is transitive on the domain

R
N
.
Proof. Obviously, jN j  3. It is straightforward to adjust the denition of a xed-
strictly-quasi-concave welfare function to C
N
and to show that Lemma 3.6 remains
true. Hence, by Proposition 3.1, simple majority voting is transitive on the domain
C
N
.
Suppose that

R
N
is a domain such that R
N


R
N
and majority voting is tran-
sitive. Thus, g
m
is a welfare function with domain

R
N
satisfying weak Pareto and
independence of irrelevant alternatives. Suppose that

RnC 6= ;. Let R
0
2

RnC.
Dene f : R
Nnfng
! W as follows: for all R 2 R
Nnfng
, f(R)  g
m
(R;R
0
). Because
g
m
is simple majority voting and jN j  3, f satises weak Pareto. Thus, f is a wel-
fare function satisfying weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives. Let
S  f1; : : : ;
1
2
(jN j   1)g. By denition of f and the fact that g
m
is simple majority
voting, we have
~
f(
S
;
Nn(S[fng)
) = R
0
. Because R
0
is not strictly quasi-concave,
this contradicts Lemma 3.4. 
4 Multi-Dimensional Policy Spaces
This section considers environments where the set of alternatives is multi-dimensional
and connected. Let A  R
m
be a set of alternatives such that the relative interior of
A in R
m
is non-empty. A preference relation R
i
2 W is Euclidean if there exists a
bliss point p(R
i
) 2 A such that for all a; b 2 A, aR
i
b , ka   p(R
i
)k  kb   p(R
i
)k
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(here k  k denotes the Euclidean norm in R
m
). In this section, R denotes the set of
all Euclidean preferences over A.
For the special case of A = R
m
, Border (1984) and Le Breton and Weymark (1996)
establish Arrow's theorem. For A = R
m
+
, Le Breton and Weymark (2000a,b) show
Arrow's theorem. However, all these results rely importantly on the unboundedness
of the set of alternatives. In real life, policy makers face budget constraints and these
results do not apply.
We establish the following theorem: Arrow's requirements are inconsistent if the
set of alternatives has a non-empty and connected interior and it is contained in the
closure of its interior (i.e. its boundary has no \tails").
Let intA denote the interior of A in R
m
and cl(A) the closure of A in R
m
.
Theorem 4.1 Let A  R
m
be such that intA 6= ;, intA is connected, and A 
cl(intA). If m  2, then weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and
non-dictatorship are inconsistent on the domain R
N
.
In particular, Theorem 4.1 yields Arrow's theorem for compact and convex sets
of policy alternatives with non-empty interior.
If the interior of the set of alternatives is non-empty and not connected, then an
Arrovian social welfare function may not be dictatorial.
Example 4.1 Let m  2, A
1
 [0; 1] [0; 1], A
2
 [0; 1] [9; 10], and A  A
1
[ A
2
.
For all R 2 R
N
, let '(R)jA
1
= R
1
jA
1
, '(R)jA
2
= R
2
jA
2
, and for all a 2 A
1
and all
b 2 A
2
, '(R)jfa; bg = R
1
jfa; bg. Then ' is an Arrovian welfare function satisfying
non-dictatorship. 
The conclusion of Example 4.1 does not remain true if the sets A
1
and A
2
are
connected through a line segment, for example if A = A
1
[ A
2
[ [(0; 0); (0; 10)]. For
this set of alternatives an Arrovian welfare function must be dictatorial.
5
5
By Theorem 4.1, f jA
1
and f jA
2
are dictatorial. Because A
1
and A
2
are connected through the
line segment [(0; 0); (0; 10)] it follows from Theorem 3.2 that the dictator of f jA
1
and f jA
2
is the
same and f is dictatorial.
20
If the boundary of A contains tails, then again an Arrovian welfare function may
not be dictatorial.
Example 4.2 Let m  2, N  f1; 2g, B  [0; 1] [0; 1], and L  ](0; 1); (0; 2)]. Let
A  B [ L. For all R 2 R
N
and all a; b 2 A, (i) if a; b 2 L, a
2
< b
2
, and for some
i 2 N , aP
i
b, then :bf(R)a, and (ii) otherwise, f(R)jfa; bg = R
1
jfa; bg. We show
that f is a welfare function.
Claim: For all R 2 R
N
, f(R) is transitive.
Proof of Claim. If p(R
1
) 2 B, then f(R) = R
1
. Let p(R
1
) 2 L and a; b; c 2 A.
If a; b; c 2 B or a; b; c 2 L, then it is easy to check that f(R)jfa; b; cg is transitive.
If a 2 L and b; c 2 B, then f(R)jfa; b; cg = R
1
jfa; b; cg and f(R)jfa; b; cg is tran-
sitive. Let a; b 2 L and c 2 B. Then f(R)jfa; cg = R
1
jfa; cg and f(R)jfb; cg =
R
1
jfb; cg. Obviously, if f(R)jfa; bg = R
1
jfa; bg, then f(R)jfa; b; cg is transitive. Let
f(R)jfa; bg 6= R
1
jfa; bg. Without loss of generality, suppose that a
2
< b
2
. Thus, by
(i), :bf(R)a, and a
2
 p
2
(R
1
). Then aP
1
c and :cf(R)a. Hence, f(R)jfa; b; cg is
transitive. 
Now it is easy to check that f is a welfare function satisfying weak Pareto, inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives, and non-dictatorship. 
4.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1
Let
6
f be a welfare function satisfying weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant
alternatives. Given X  A, let f
X
denote the restriction of f to the set of alternatives
X. Formally, for all R 2 R
N
such that for all i 2 N , p(R
i
) 2 X, let f
X
(RjX) 
f(R)jX. It is straightforward that f
X
inherits weak Pareto and independence of
irrelevant alternatives from f .
6
The rst version of the paper used Theorem 3.2 to prove Theorem 4.1 for the case when A is
compact and convex. A proof using Arrow's theorem was suggested by John Duggan to the rst
author while he was visiting University of Rochester. Independently the second author established
the proof below.
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We introduce additional notation. Let a; b; c 2 R
m
be three distinct alternatives.
Let [a; b] denote the line segment between a and b, i.e. [a; b]  fa + (1   )b j 2
[0; 1]g. Let H(a; b) denote the hyperplane that bisects [a; b] perpendicularly. In the
non-degenerate case, that is a, b, and c are non-colinear, the hyperplanes H(a; b),
H(a; c), and H(b; c) determine six disjoint open cones, say \(abc), \(acb), \(bac),
\(bca), \(cab), and \(cba) (see Figure 1). We named these cones such that for all
R
i
2 R, p(R
i
) 2 \(acb) , aP
i
cP
i
b. The same holds for the other cones. Note that
the collective boundary of \(abc) and \(acb) is a subset of H(b; c). Let \(a(bc))
denote the set of all points x 2 H(b; c) such that for R
i
2 R, if p(R
i
) = x, then
aP
i
bI
i
c.
Given a 2 R
m
and  > 0, let
J
(a; ) denote the open ball with center a and radius
, i.e.
J
(a; )  fx 2 R
m
j ka  xk < g. Given a; b; c 2 R
m
, let plane(a; b; c) denote
the plane spanned by a, b, and c, i.e. plane(a; b; c)  fa+ (b  a) + (c  a) j;  2
Rg. Finally, let 4(a; b; c) denote the triangle with corner points a, b, and c, i.e.
4(a; b; c)  fa + b + (1      )c j;   0& +   1g. The baricenter of
4(a; b; c) is the point
1
3
(a+ b + c).
The following lemma generalizes Lemma 3.2.
Lemma 4.1 Let S  N and a; b 2 A be such that a 6= b. Let c 2 Anfa; bg be such
that \(abc) \ A 6= ;, \(bac) \ A 6= ;, \(b(ac)) \ A 6= ;, and \(bca) \ A 6= ;. If
S 2 D
s
(a; b), then S 2 D(a; c).
Proof. Let R 2 R
N
be such that for all i 2 S, aP
i
c. Let S
0
 fi 2 N j aP
i
cg,
T  fi 2 N j aI
i
cg, and V  fi 2 N j cP
i
ag. Because \(abc), \(bac), \(b(ac)), and
\(bca) have a non-empty intersection with A, there exists
~
R 2 R
N
such that for all
i 2 S, a
~
P
i
b
~
P
i
c, for all i 2 S
0
nS, b
~
P
i
a
~
P
i
c, for all i 2 T , b
~
P
i
a
~
I
i
c, and for all i 2 V ,
b
~
P
i
c
~
P
i
a. By S 2 D
s
(a; b) and independence of irrelevant alternatives, af(
~
R)b. By
weak Pareto, :cf(
~
R)b. Thus, by transitivity of f(
~
R), :cf(
~
R)a. Hence, by indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives, :cf(R)a and S 2 D(a; c), the desired conclusion. 
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Note that if A is the real line, then the assumptions of Lemma 4.1 only hold if
a < b < c or a > b > c. While in the one-dimensional case, Lemma 4.1 implies only a
limited decisiveness power, in the multi-dimensional case decisiveness appears to be
unbounded.
For the moment, suppose that A is convex. Let a; b; c 2 A be three distinct
alternatives. Then \(abc)\A 6= ;, \(bac)\A 6= ;, \(b(ac))\A 6= ;, and \(bca)\A 6=
; whenever \(abc)\A 6= ; and \(bca)\A 6= ;. Because A is convex \(abc)\A 6= ; if
the baricenter of 4(a; b; c) belongs to the same half plane to which c belongs induced
by the line containing [a; b] in plane(a; b; c). This means that 4(a; b; c) is acute at c.
Similarly \(bca) \ A 6= ; if 4(a; b; c) is acute at a. This is accomplished if c belongs
to Y (a; b)  fx 2 An
J
(
1
2
(a + b);
1
2
ka   bk) j x is in the same open halfspace as b,
where this halfspace is induced by the hyperplane through a perpendicular to [a; b]g
(see Figure 2).
These considerations together with Lemma 4.1 yield the following.
Lemma 4.2 Let A be convex and a; b 2 A be such that a 6= b. If S 2 D
s
(a; b), then
for all c 2 Y (a; b), S 2 D(a; c).
The following lemma expands this decisiveness power even further if
J
(a; ka bk)
is a subset of A. Given a set X  R
m
, let @X  cl(X)n intX denote the boundary
of X.
Lemma 4.3 Let A be convex and a; b 2 A be such that a 6= b and
J
(a; ka bk)  A.
If S 2 D
s
(a; b), then for all c 2 Anfag, S 2 D(a; c).
Proof. Note that by
J
(a; ka bk)  A, [
x2@
J
(a;ka bk)
Y (a; x) = Anfag. By Lemma
4.2, for all c 2 Y (a; b) \ @
J
(a; ka   bk), S 2 D(a; c). Because S 2 D(a; c) implies
S 2 D
s
(a; c), Lemma 4.2 implies that for all c 2 Y (a; b) \ @
J
(a; ka   bk) and all
c
0
2 Y (a; c), S 2 D(a; c
0
). Hence, for all c 2 Anfag, S 2 D(a; c). 
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Next by applying Lemma 4.3 and Arrow's theorem we show that if the set of
alternatives is an open ball, then f is dictatorial.
Lemma 4.4 Let x 2 R
m
,  > 0, and A =
J
(x; ). Then f is dictatorial.
Proof. Let a; b 2
J
(x; ) be such that a 6= b. Because a; b =2 @
J
(x; ), there exists
c 2
J
(x; ) such that 4(a; b; c) is acute. But then the baricenter of 4(a; b; c) belongs
to 4(a; b; c). Hence, for all u; v; w 2 fa; b; cg such that fu; v; wg = fa; b; cg, \(uvw)\
J
(x; ) 6= ;.
7
Applying Arrow's theorem yields that f
fa;b;cg
is dictatorial with dictator
i
fa;b;cg
. Since c 2
J
(x; ), there exists 
0
> 0 such that
J
(c; 
0
) 
J
(x; ). Now
we can nd a
0
; b
0
2
J
(c; 
0
) such that 4(a
0
; b
0
; c) is acute and
J
(c; ka
0
  ck) 
J
(c; 
0
). Similarly to 4(a; b; c), Arrow's theorem implies that f
fa
0
;b
0
;cg
is dictatorial
with dictator i
fa
0
;b
0
;cg
. Because fi
fa
0
;b
0
;cg
g 2 D(c; a
0
) and
J
(c; ka
0
  ck) 
J
(x; ),
Lemma 4.3 implies that for all y 2
J
(x; )nfcg, fi
fa
0
;b
0
;cg
g 2 D(c; y). Therefore,
fi
fa
0
;b
0
;cg
g 2 D(c; a) and fi
fa;b;cg
g 2 D(c; a). Thus, i
fa
0
;b
0
;cg
= i
fa;b;cg
.
Hence, we have shown that for all a; b 2
J
(x; ) such that a 6= b, there exists
c 2
J
(x; ) and i
fa;b;cg
2 N such that i
fa;b;cg
is decisive over \a preferred to b",
over \b preferred to a", over \c preferred to a", and for all y 2
J
(x; )nfcg, over
\c preferred to y". Clearly it follows that i
fa;b;cg
is the same individual for all those
a; b; c 2
J
(x; ). Let i denote this individual. Thus, for all a; b 2
J
(x; ) such that
a 6= b, i is decisive over \a preferred to b". Hence, f is dictatorial. 
Next we show that f
intA
is dictatorial if intA is connected.
Lemma 4.5 Let intA be non-empty and connected. Then f
intA
is dictatorial.
Proof. First, note that for all x 2 intA there is some 
x
> 0 such that
J
(x; 
x
) 
intA. Hence, by Lemma 4.4, f
J
(x;
x
)
is dictatorial, say with dictator i
x
.
Let a; b 2 intA be such that a 6= b. It is sucient to show that i
a
= i
b
and i
a
is
decisive over \a preferred to b".
7
In other words, the set fa; b; cg is a free triple.
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Because intA is connected, there is a path in intA from a to b. Clearly, the path
is compact and therefore, there exists a sequence c
0
; c
1
; : : : ; c
k
on this path and  > 0
such that (i) c
0
= a and c
k
= b, (ii) for all t 2 f0; 1; : : : ; kg,
J
(c
t
; )  intA, (iii) for
all t 2 f1; : : : ; kg,
J
(c
t 1
; ) \ fc
t
; c
t+1
; : : : ; c
k
g = fc
t
g. For all t 2 f0; 1; : : : ; kg, let
i
t
denote the dictator of f
J
(c
t
;)
.
By (i), (ii), and (iii), it follows that i
a
= i
0
= i
1
=    = i
k
= i
b
. Thus, i
a
= i
b
.
For all t 2 f1; : : : ; k   1g, let R
t
i
a
2 R be such that p(R
t
i
a
) = c
t 1
. Thus, by (iii),
c
t 1
P
t
i
a
c
t
P
t
i
a
b. Using these preferences, the fact that i
a
= i
k 1
= i
b
, (iii), and transi-
tivity, it follows that i
a
is decisive over \c
k 2
preferred to b". Then, by i
a
= i
k 2
= i
b
and the previous fact, i
a
is decisive over \c
k 3
preferred to b". Continuing in this way
it follows that for all t 2 f1; : : : ; kg, i
a
is decisive over \c
k t
preferred to b". Hence,
i
a
is decisive over \a preferred to b", the desired conclusion. 
Our nal lemma completes the proof of Theorem 4.1. If AnintA contains no
\tails", i.e. A  cl(intA), then dictatorship on the interior of A expands to the whole
set A.
Lemma 4.6 Let intA be non-empty and connected, and A  cl(intA). If f
intA
is
dictatorial, then f is dictatorial.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let 1 be the dictator of f
intA
. We show that 1 is
the dictator of f .
Let a; b 2 A be such that a 6= b. Let R 2 R
N
be such that aP
1
b. It suces to
show that :bf(R)a.
Let S  fi 2 N j aP
i
bg, T  fi 2 N j aI
i
bg, and V  fi 2 N j bP
i
ag. Because
A  cl(intA) and intA is connected, there exists a path from a to b in intA such
that a and b are the only possible points on this path belonging to An intA. Thus,
intA \H(a; b) 6= ;. Let h 2 intA \ H(a; b) be such that h 6=
1
2
(a + b) and R
0
2 R
N
be such that for all i 2 S, p(R
0
i
) = a, for all i 2 T , p(R
0
i
) = h, and for all i 2 V ,
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p(R
0
i
) = b. Thus, by R
0
jfa; bg = Rjfa; bg and independence of irrelevant alternatives,
f(R)jfa; bg = f(R
0
)jfa; bg: (2)
We consider four cases.
Case 1: a; b 2 intA.
Then for all i 2 N , p(R
0
i
) 2 intA. Because f
intA
is dictatorial with dictator 1 and
1 2 S, it follows that :bf(R
0
)a. Hence, by (2), :bf(R)a, the desired conclusion.
Case 2: a 2 intA and b 2 An intA.
Because a 2 intA, for some 0 <  <
1
4
ka   bk we have
J
(a; )  intA. Let
c 2
J
(a; )\ plane(a; b; h) \ @
J
(
1
2
(a + b);
1
2
ka   bk) be such that kh   ck < kh  
ak. Because h 2 intA \ H(a; b) and by our choice of c, h 2 @\(c(ba)). Thus,
\(cba)\ intA 6= ;. Let R
00
2 R
N
be such that for all i 2 S [ T , R
00
i
= R
0
i
, and
for all i 2 V , p(R
00
i
) 2 \(cba)\ intA. Then by construction we have for all i 2 S,
aP
00
i
cP
00
i
b, for all i 2 T , cP
00
i
aI
00
i
b, and for all i 2 V , cP
00
i
bP
00
i
a. In particular we have
R
00
jfa; bg = R
0
jfa; bg = Rjfa; bg. By a; c 2 intA and aP
00
1
c, Case 1 yields :cf(R
00
)a.
By weak Pareto, :bf(R
00
)c. Thus, by transitivity of f(R
00
), :bf(R
00
)a. Hence, by
independence of irrelevant alternatives, f(R
00
)jfa; bg = f(R)jfa; bg and :bf(R)a, the
desired conclusion.
Case 3: a 2 An intA and b 2 intA.
By taking c close to b in the interior of A such that 4(a; b; c) is rightangeled
at c and h is closer to b than to c and observing that \(bac)\ intA 6= ; because
h 2 \((ba)c) is on the boundary, we deduce similarly to Case 2 that :bf(R)a.
Case 4: a; b 2 An intA.
Because A  cl(intA), we can nd c 2 intA such that kc ak < kc  bk. By Cases
2 and 3 and transitivity of f(R
0
) it follows that :bf(R
0
)a. Hence, by (2), :bf(R)a,
the desired conclusion. 
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we solve a classical open problem in Arrovian social choice. For a one-
dimensional policy space and the domain of single-peaked preferences, we characterize
the social welfare functions satisfying weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant
alternatives. As a corollary we obtain that majority voting is transitive if and only if
the number of individuals is odd and individual preferences are strictly quasi-concave.
A parallel line of research considers social choice functions. In this case, the ob-
jective is to choose for each admissible set, called an agenda, the socially optimal
alternatives in this set. Arrow's choice axiom requires that if for an admissible set
and some admissible subset of it, some choices made at the former set belong to the
smaller set, then the choices at the latter set are exactly the choices made at the for-
mer set that belong to the smaller set (Arrow, 1959).
8
In spatial environments with
one-dimensional policy spaces and agenda domain consisting of all compact intervals,
the social choice functions satisfying weak Pareto, Arrow's choice axiom, and indepen-
dence of infeasible alternatives have been investigated (Moulin, 1984; Ehlers, 2001).
These papers obtain characterizations of the \generalized median rules" by these and
additional axioms. A generalized median rule assigns to each compact interval and
each prole the point belonging to the compact interval that is closest to the median
of the peaks reported by the voters and 2
N
xed voters. The quasi bliss points of the
2
N
xed strictly quasi-concave preferences play the role of these xed voters. The
quasi bliss point of the social ordering chosen by an Arrovian welfare function for a
prole of preferences is the outcome of the generalized median rule applied to this
prole of quasi bliss points. However, the natural correspondence between generalized
median rules and Arrovian welfare functions fails because the median may not be the
socially most preferred alternative. The class of welfare functions underlying median
rules is smaller than the class of Arrovian welfare functions: in the former the social
8
Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (2001) consider Arrovian-type axioms in elections in which
candidates have the possibilty to withdraw. See also Ehlers and Weymark (2001).
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ordering is single-peaked.
The same applies to the strand of literature on strategy-proof social choice rules
when the set of alternatives is one-dimensional (Moulin, 1980; Border and Jordan,
1983; Kim and Roush, 1984; Barbera, Gul, and Stacchetti, 1993). For the case of
a nite set of alternatives and unrestricted domain, Satterthwaite (1975) associates
with each social choice rule satisfying strategy-proofness and unanimity an Arrovian
welfare function. For his construction it is essential that any pair of alternatives can
be moved to the top two positions in each agent's preference relation. It is obvious
that this trick does not work in spatial environments.
For the case when preferences are Euclidean and the set of alternatives is R
m
or R
m
+
(where m  2), Arrow's theorem has been previously established. However,
these proofs do not apply for instance to the triangle with endpoints (0; 0), (1; 0),
and (0:5; 0:1). Then it is not possible to nd a point x belonging to this triangle
such that (0; 0), x, and (1; 0) are a free triple. We are the rst to show Arrow's
theorem when the set of alternatives is compact and convex. Here, we could have
tried to follow another classical method of proof. From a social welfare function
satisfying weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives we could have
constructed a two-agents social choice function C with compact and convex agenda
domain (including line segments) as follows: x two coalitions S and NnS (where
S 6= ; and S 6= N) and consider only proles where all agents belonging to S have
the same preference relation and all agents belonging toNnS have the same preference
relation. For each compact and convex agenda A
0
and each prole (R
S
; R
NnS
) 2 RR
(here S denotes \agent 1" and NnS \agent 2"), let C choose the quasi bliss point
of f(R
S
; R
NnS
)j[p(R
S
jA
0
); p(R
NnS
jA
0
)]. Since at proles with only two peaks, the
weak Pareto set in A
0
is the line segment [p(R
S
jA
0
); p(R
NnS
jA
0
)] it is easy to see
that C satises weak Pareto, Arrow's choice axiom, and independence of infeasible
alternatives. Then we could apply Duggan's (1996) theorem for spatial environments
saying that C must be dictatorial with dictator S or NnS.
9
However, Duggan's
9
Duggan's (1996) theorem does not hold if the agenda domain consists only of non-degenerate
28
theorem requires the preference domain to contain non-Euclidean preferences and
our impossibility result does not.
compact and convex sets and preferences are Euclidean. Then Bergson-Samuelson welfare functions
are Arrovian (Le Breton and Weymark, 2000b).
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Figure 1: Illustration of the sets \(abc), \(acb), \(bac), \(bca), \(cab), and \(cba)
for non-colinear a, b, and c in R
2
.
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Y (a; b)
q
a
q
b
&%
'$
Figure 2: If A = R
2
, then Y (a; b) is the half space right of the perpendicular to [a; b]
through a excluding the set
J
(
1
2
(a+ b);
1
2
ka  bk).
34
